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Abstract
This study is conducted in the Capital of Guinea-Bissau. The research analyzes gender
bias in education on ethnicity, religion and income. An exogenous shock at household level
on food security is used for income. OLS and Fixed Effect models are estimated among
four different age groups. Findings show the absence of gender gap in primary education,
however opposite results emerge for older girls. The hypothesis behind this difference is the
extension of compulsory education from 6th to 9th grade which is supported by the findings.
The main conclusions shed light to the role of formal Institutions in correcting gender bias.
Keywords: Gender Gap, Education, Social norms, Institutions
1 Introduction
The study is conducted in the African Republic of Guinea-Bissau, one of the poorest and most
fragile countries in the world. Traditions and customs influence the stage of life, household
structure and daily activities in the whole country. Patriarchal rules justify males primary power
and decisions over household members1. Women are traditionally responsible for domestic duties
and custody of children. The facts described above may lead to the conclusion that women in
these societies have less opportunity than men, first among all education. This said, the primary
question of interest is whether gender gap in the Capital of Guinea-Bissau, Autonomous Sector of
Bissau, exists. The role of ethnicity and religion is further explored as well as household income
heterogeneity. Lastly, the focus moves towards the role of formal Institutions embodied by the
educational reform implemented in 2011 which extended primary compulsory education from
6th to 9th grade.
Data used for this study has been collected in the Autonomous Sector of Bissau in June 2017 in
the framework of the project "Strategy to accelerate the reduction of maternal, neonatal and child
mortality in Guinea-Bissau, Autonomous Sector of Bissau" by ONG VIDA and NOVAFRICA.
The 2009 population Census reports that more than twenty ethnic groups coexist in the country
and more than one religion is professed among the population2. This makes Autonomous Sector
of Bissau an ideal context to investigate on the heterogeneity of ethnicity and religion. The
1Article 1674 of Civil Code states that the family structure is based on Patriarchal Model whereby the husband
is the Head of the household and he can represent the wife in public.
2Refer to Recenseamento geral da população e habitação Guiné-Bissau : III RGPH/2009 issued by Instituto
Nacional de Estatística e Censos and Ministério da Economia, do Plano e Integração Regional in 2009.
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difficulty in separating economic factors from culture and social norms within societies, have
prevented economists from addressing culture (Fernandez and Fogli 2009), however the latter
is key for explaining a variety of socio-economic outcomes (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
2006). The paper aims at enriching existing literature on gender bias in education by exploring
intra-household educational preferences by social norms and income. Additionally, the study
contributes to research on schooling in SAB which lacked comprehensive household data sets.
OLS and Fixed Effect models are estimated to analyze the existence of gender bias on educational
outcomes among different age groups and hetereogeneity of education on ethnicity, religion and
income. To analyze educational outcomes on households economic conditions, an exogenous
income shock has been used. In particular, the shock refers to self-reported data on food security
at household level in the previous twelve months. Findings show that there is no gender gap in
primary education, however gender differences exist for the group aged from twenty to twenty-
five years old. Results for ethnicity and religion reinforce this outcome, i.e. social norms do not
influence compulsory education. Additionally, socio-economic conditions are proven not to be a
determinant for gender bias for mandatory schooling.
The hypothesis behind the absence of gender bias in younge cohorts is the change in the legislation
under the educational reform of 2011 which extended compulsory primary education from 6th to
9th grade. Findings on the outcomes of the reform prove indeed that young girls under the new
rule are more likely to complete 9th grade. The main conclusions shed light to the role of formal
Institutions in correcting gender bias. From the findings gender gap in education is indeed evident
when education is no longer mandatory and decisions on continuing studying are not anymore
binding from the law.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows Section2 provides literature review on existing
studies on gender bias and education, intra-households preferences on human capital allocation
andself-insurance strategies among constraint families in developing countries. Section 3, Section
4 and Section 5 describes data, presents the estimation strategy and reports the main econometric
results respectively. Section 6 describes the limitation of the model and Section 7 concludes by
proposing some policy implications.
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2 Literature Review
Empirical research has always addressed potential gender inequalities on education, health and
labor opportunities. In developing countries, these outcomes have proven to exist with long-term
consequences on economic growth (Dollar and Gatti 1999). Among poor households, the level
of economic risk, characterized by inadequate capital and insurance markets, conditions demo-
graphic decisions and allocation of resources among members in households. Collective models
are used to capture differences arising within households and identify the drivers of inequalities
among individuals (McElroy and Horney 1981).
Existing literature identifies potential source of discrimination from parental preferences, cultural
values and socio-economic factors. In first place, parents have preferences over their children
and the respective level of investment may depend on factors such as gender, age, birth order,
relationship to household head (Ota and Moffatt 2007). Human capital investment may be con-
centrated on few children rather than distributed equally across members (Dahan and Tsiddon
1998) and sibling sex composition may determine differences in health and education outcomes
(Garg and Morduch 1996). With respect on schooling, gender differences are related to parental
preferences, differences in return and opportunity cost of education. When women are discrim-
inated in the labour-market, monetary benefits to invest in female education are lower than for
boys since schooling is not perceived as a valuable investment. Gender bias within families is
indeed stronger when the latter has an impact on future household labour supply patterns (Li
and Wu 2011). Additionally, the quality of schooling for girls is on average lower compared to
boys due to time spent for housework with long-term consequences on educational returns (Glick
and Sahn 2000). In second place, intra-households inequalities are proven to be driven by social
values and cultural bias. Institutional and legal norms such as laws, type of marriage, inheritance
and access to common property resources varying according to location, ethnicity and religion
(Duflo and Udry 2004) may help explaining variations on gender (Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix
2002). Social values influence Institutional settings under which roles, rights and obligations are
clearly differentiated among females and males (Pande and Astone 2007). In African societies,
religion continues to play an important role in socio-economic and political life. Religion may
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justify norms restricting women mobility and limiting opportunities to work (Field, Jayachan-
dran, and Pande 2010). In polygamous societies, discrimination against un-favored wives and
their children may result in heavier domestic workloads, poorer levels of education, nutrition and
health care (Brown 1996). Lastly, inequalities within families may be driven by socio-economic
conditions (Fuwa et al. 2006). Children may serve as incomplete insurance good within house-
hold as alternative to savings and borrowing when the possibility for risk diversification is little
(Pörtner 2001). Empirical findings show indeed that income does have a direct and significant
effect on children outcomes. All studies are associated by potential endogeneity of income which
is a threat to establish causality. To overcome this problem, studies have exploited exogenous
income variability such as macroeconomic crises (Thomas et al. 2004), commodity price changes
(Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005), shocks on production (Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti 2006) or target
policy reforms (Duflo, 2000).
3 Data
Data used in this study have been collected in the framework of the project "Strategy to accelerate
the reduction of maternal, neonatal and child mortality in Guinea-Bissau, Autonomous Sector
of Bissau" by Mattia Fracchia, Teresa Molina and Pedro Vicente. The surveys were conducted
by a team of enumerators with the collaboration of the author and colleagues. Households
living in the Autonomous Sector of Bissau (ASB) have been interviewed from the 1st of July
to 30th of August of 2017. The survey was conducted among 2147 households, with a total of
15583 individual observations. Household demographic data have been collected by community
health Agents under the supervision of ONG VIDA within ASB. In addition, two households
per community health Agent have been randomly selected and interviewed by enumerators. The
collection process and sample size allows to have a representative sample for household living in
SAB.
The survey specifically identifies household members as individual who eat from the same pan.
Households in Guinea-Bissau are indeed extended families. They can be vertically extended
(three or more generations live in the same household), horizontally extended (siblings with their
spouses and their children living together) or a combination of both types. Individuals who do
not share family ties may also live in the same household. The questionnaire was tailored to
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obtain information on household and individual characteristics. In the first part of the interview,
each household head was interviewed on general information such as language spoken, ethnicity,
religion professed, accommodation facilities, assets and aggregate consumption. Afterwards,
householdmembers living in the household were interviewed on information regarding education,
housework and employment.
3.1 Educational variable and age groups
Under the legislation of Guinea-Bissau, primary education is declared universal and compulsory
until 9th grade, free until 6th class. Primary school (ensino basico) lasts from 1st grade to 9th
grade, subdivided into three sub-cycles3. After completing 9th grade, students have access to
secondary education (ensino secundário) or vocational education, both lasting three years. A
variety of variables have been used in this paper referring to Guinean educational system. The
variable Years of Education accounts for individuals highest level of education. Attendance is
a dummy variable for students attending any type of educational Institution during 2016-2017.
Dummy variables for Completed 4th, Completed 6th, Completed 9th, Vocational Education and
Higher Education are constructed. The variable Years Behind accounts for the years students are
behind the grade they should be according to their age4.
Four different age groups have been identified among individuals from six to twenty five years
old. Group 1 represents children between six and eleven years completing First Cycle (4th grade).
Group 2 define teenagers from twelve to fifteen years old completing Second Cycle (6th grade).
Compulsory education lasts until 9th for both groups. Group 3 accounts for teenagers from sixteen
to nineteen years old. Group 4 represents individuals aged between twenty to twenty-five years.
Compulsory education lasted until 6th grade. TheMinistry of Education reformed the educational
system in 2011. The Reform Lei de Bases do Sistema Eudcativo extended compulsory primary
education from 6th grade to 9th grade. Assuming that the reform has been implemented in
September 2012, the first group of students experiencing the extension of compulsory education
from 6th to 9th grade was aged seventeen in June 20175. The variable Reform is used to identify
3 The first cycle is from 1st to 4th grade, the second from 5th to 6th grade and third from 7th to 9th grade.
4 Years Behind = abs[(age-years of education)-6], where years of educations are restricted between zero and nine
(compulsory primary education) and respective age from six to sixteen years old(corresponding age for primary
education)
5Assuming that the cohort of Student in 6th grade in 2012 were twelve years old.
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students under the new legislation and compare education gap before and after the implementation
of the Law, focusing on girls around the age of those who were affected.
3.2 Income
The variable Monthly Expenditure from the survey is used as proxy for household income. It
gathers information on household monthly expenditure6. Annual Expenditure is also calculated7.
All values of expenditure are in CFA franc, where 1CFA is 0,002€; however for ease of interpre-
tation a log transformation is used. Two variables from the survey are analyzed and used as proxy
for household income shock. The first question of the survey was "How many times, if any, a
member of the household did not have enough food to eat in the previous twelve months?" The
available answers were "Many times (5 or 6 times)", "Sometimes (2 or 4 times)", "Only once"
and "Never". A dummy variable No Annual Shock was created taking value one for household
answering "Only once" and "Sometimes", i.e. families not experiencing a shock in the previous
year. The second question was "Did the household worry of not having enough food in the
previous thirty days?". The available answers were "Never", "Rarely (1 to 2 times), "Sometimes
(3 to 10 times)" and "Frequently" (10 times). A dummy variable No Monthly Shock was created
taking value one for household answering "Never" and "Rarely". No differences are found on
annual income distributions for households experiencing a shock compared to the other group and
information on the timing and nature of annual shocks is not available. Nevertheless, for shock
experienced in the previous months information on consumption is available and household dis-
tributions on expenditure differ among the two groups 8. Given that the decrease in consumption
is correlated with a shock in the short term, it is assumed that the same has occured in the long
term. Low levels of food consumption are treated as a proxy for income shock in households
from the Autonomous Sector of Bissau. Empirical findings indicates indeed that households in
developing countries are able to mitigate adverse effects of income shock to limit consumption
6The value must satisfy the following condition : rent, credit for mobile ,alcoholic beverages, food and beverage,
food outside home ,electricity and water less than Monthly expenditure. The question of the survey was asked to the
head of the household.
7Weekly expenditure on food and beverages, alcoholic beverages, food outside home, electricity and water,
transport have been transformed in monthly expenditure. Semiannual expenditure on clothing, school, university,
house improvements, health, and ceremonies has been transformed inmonthly expenditure. Bothmonthly expenditure
are summed and multiplied for 12 months.




























Monthly Household Expenditure by shock
(b) Monthly Expenditure
Figure 1: Household Expenditure by shock
risk and adopt strategies against income fluctuations (Alderman and Paxson 1992). Additionally,
available data on Guinea-Bissau prove that food security is not a concern for households9.
4 Estimation Strategies
The first OLS specification used for gender differences on educational variables is the following:






i + εi (1)
yi is educational outcome (years of education, completed 4th grade, completed 6th grade, com-
pleted 9th grade, whether children continue studying after reaching compulsory 9th grade, atten-
dance and number of years behind grade given student’s age). i are identifiers for individuals.
Femalei is a dummy variable for gender, taking value one if the individual is female. β1 is the
coefficient of interest. E′i is a vector for ethnicity, R
′
i is a vector for religion and X
′
i is a vector of
individual characteristics10. Dummies for age are included. Robust standard errors are used to
correct for heteroscedascity.
Data is available is at individual level allowing for the estimation of a Fixed Effect model used
to correct for households unobserved characteristics :
yi h = α + β1Femalei h + δWi
′
h + Ch + εi h (2)
9Refer to Enquête de suivi Alimentaire et de la Nutrition Guinée Bissau issued by World Food Program, Food
and Agriculture Organization of United Nations and the Government of Guinea-Bissau in 2017.
10Dummy if the individual is the son/daughter of head of household, individuals’ number of siblings, dummy
if the individual is the 1st child born within the household, dummy if the individual is the last child born in the
household, dummy for literate mother, dummy for literate father, dummy for mother living in the house, dummy for
father living in the house, years of education of household head and age of household head.
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yi h is educational outcome. i are identifiers for individuals. h identifies households11. β1 is
the coefficient of interest. Wi
′
h is a vector of individual characteristics12. Dummies for age are
included. Robust standard errors are used to correct for heteroscedascity.
To investigate the role of ethnicity and religion on education within the sample, two models
are used. In the first place, OLS model (1) with interactions between gender, ethnicity and
religion13 . Next, FE Model (2) is estimated conditional on ethnicity and religion. Due to lack of
heterogeneity for specific variables, different controls have been used for each ethnic and religious
group and corresponding age groups.
The second line of research is on gender differences in education by income14. The following
OLS Reduced Form is estimated to capture the effect of households income shocks on education
outcomes :






i + εi (5)







i . The variable NoShocki refers to household that did not suffer income shock in the previous
twelve months. Model (2) conditioned on income shock is estimated to control for household
unobserved characteristics.
11 Fixed effect model is also used for nuclear families within households : children having the same mother and
some father, children with the same mother and different fathers, children with the same mother, but no father living
in the household. The comparison is among siblings living in the same house.
12Dummy if the individual is the son/daughter of head of household, individuals’ number of siblings, dummy
if the individual is the 1st child born within the household, dummy if the individual is the last child born in the
household, dummy for literate mother, dummy for literate father, dummy for mother living in the house, dummy for
father living in the house.
13
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i + εi (4)
14An Instrumental Variable approach would be ideal to correct for endogeneity between income and education.
Available data do not include household income variation and the variables from the survey for income shock have
been proven to be weak instruments. Household monthly expenditure has been instrumented with variables on
household shock. First stage results : No Monthly Shock coefficient is 0.1461 at 1% and F statistics is 18.22; No
Annual Shock coefficient is 0.0870 at 1% and F statistics is 17.98.
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To account for the effect of Institutions on educational outcomes, the following Fixed Effect
model is estimated :
yi h = α + β1Femalei h + β2Re f ormi h + β3Re f orm ∗ Femalei h + δWi
′
H + Ch + εi h (6)
yi h is a dummy variable for completed 9th grade. β3 is the coefficient of interested capturing
differences between female and male affected by the reform15. Robust standard errors are used to
correct for heteroscedascity. As explained in Section 3, the variable Reform identifies the treated
group affected by the new legislation. It is assumed that treatment assignment is random at the
threshold for treatment, for this model individuals younger than seventeen years old. Students
above and below the threshold are assumed to have similar characteristics, except for the treatment.
The procedure therefore allows to compare education gap before and after the implementation of
the Law, focusing on girls around the age of those who were affected by the new rule.
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics of sample characteristics are depicted in Table 7 in the Appendix. 71% of
household heads are male. On average, head of households are 45 years old and have completed
8.6 years of education. The average number of members in households is 8.9
For the ease of interpretation, seven different ethnicity were grouped and used for the analysis.
21.1% are Felupe; 20.4% are Balanta, 19.5% are Papeis, 13.5% are Fula, 13.6% are Mandinga
and 11.8% are from other ethnicity. On religion, 51.1% of households are Christians, 32.8% are
Muslims, 9.5% declares of not professing any religion, 4.7% are Animist and 1.9% profess more
than one religion within household.
On educational variables, students are on average 2.42 years behind the grade thy should attend.
Average years of education for Group 1 are 2.06 and 17.4% of children have completed 4th grade.
Group 2 average years of education is 5.32, teenagers completing 6th are 48.1%. Among Group
3, years of school completed are 7.92, 43% completed 9th grade and 25.9% continue in higher
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Years of education by gender ( individuals under 25 yers old)
Figure 2: Years of education by gender
58% continue studying after 9th grade; 45.7% continue higher education and 1.9% in vocational
education. Figure 2 depicts gender differences in education highlighting the change in trend on
educational outcomes between female and male after 9th grade.
5.2 Results on gender differences
This section reports OLS and FE estimates on effect of being female on a set of educational
outcomes. Results are depicted in Table 1. OLS Model exhibits positive correlation between
being female and years of schooling and the probability of completing 4th grade in Group 1.
Also for Group 2 a positive association is found between the probability of completing 6th grade
and gender of 7.79%, all else constant. For oldest cohort (from twenty to twenty-five), the
probability of completing 9th grade is negatively correlated with being female by 5.15%, all else
constant. When controlling for household unobserved characteristics, fixed effect results show no
significant difference between education and gender for youngest cohort. On average, inequality
between female and males living in the same household are not found for Group 1 and Group 2.
For Group 3 gender is not relevant for Educational outcome, however the sign changes compared
to the previous groups. Lastly, for Group 4 the coefficients of interest are negative and statistically
different from zero. Ceteris paribus, a female have 0.54 years of education less than a male in the
same age group. Additionally, girls are less likely to complete 9th grade by 11.68% compared
to boys, all else constant. To note, compulsory education for this group lasted until 6th grade.
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The coefficient for completed 6th show no gender differences on schooling between females and
males.
Table 1: OLS and FE regressions on educational outcomes
OLS OLS OLS OLS FE FE FE FE
6 to 11 years old Years Enrollment 4th Years behind Years Enrollment 4th Years behind
Female 0.1178** -0.0032 0.0534*** -0.0435 0.0384 0.0264 0.0412 0.0063
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10)
Observations 1543 1542 1543 1221 1617 1616 1617 1274
R2adjusted 0.479 0.111 0.301 0.139 0.596 0.158 0.370 0.217
12 to 15 years old Years Enrollment 6th Years behind Years Enrollment 6th Years behind
Female 0.2069* 0.0092 0.0779** -0.1624 0.0609 0.0056 0.0892 0.0528
(0.12) (0.02) (0.03) (0.11) (0.26) (0.03) (0.07) (0.24)
Observations 842 842 842 779 886 886 886 822
R2 adjusted 0.305 0.059 0.207 0.266 0.254 0.018 0.225 0.256
16 to 19 Years Enrollment 9th Years behind Years Enrollment 9th Years behind
Female 0.2743 0.0212 0.0274 -0.3644* -0.2529 -0.0291 -0.0621 -0.4053
(0.18) (0.03) (0.03) (0.20) (0.34) (0.06) (0.07) (0.48)
Observations 780 779 780 401 828 827 828 432
R2 adjusted 0.177 0.029 0.114 0.201 0.186 0.033 0.115 0.354
20 to 25 years old Years Enrollment 9th 6th Years Enrollment 9th 6th
Female -0.2653 0.0265 -0.0515* -0.0085 -0.5358* 0.0608 -0.1168*** -0.0033
(0.18) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.30) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02)
Observations 221 200 223 499 957 954 957 957
R2adjusted 0.221 0.233 0.406 0.180 0.067 0.140 0.065 0.040
Age dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Controls used for OLS model are dummy if the individual is the
son/daughter of head of household, individuals’ number of siblings, dummy if the individual is the 1st child born
within the household, dummy if the individual is the last child born in the household, dummy for literate mother,
dummy for literate father, dummy for mother living in the house, dummy for father living in the house, years of
education of household head and age of household head. Controls for FE model are the same of OLS with exclusion
of years of education of household head and age of household head. Robust standard errors in parenthesis to correct
for heteroscedascity.
Outcomes on housework, labor market and marriage have been also investigated to have a
broader picture on girls. Table 2 shows results for Group 2, Group 3 and Group 4. Girls between
twelve and fifteen years old are 40% more likely than boys to accomplish housework duties. For
older cohorts, girls are less likely to have an occupation compared to boys by 3% in Group 3 and
this difference increases to 8% for Group 4. These results suggest that gender gap exist from the
age of sixteen years old both in education and labor market, however several reasons may explain
the latter outcome. Female might be indeed disadvantaged because of fewer opportunities in the
labour market (Jensen 2012), but also the social context may influence their choices(Malhotra and
Mather 1997). On marriage, not significant results are found. Model (1) has been also estimated
for Families living within the same households. Results are exhibited in Table ?? in Appendix.
12
Table 2: FE model on housework, labour market and marriage















Age dummies YES YES
Controls YES YES
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Con-
trols for FE model : dummy if the individual is
the son/daughter of head of household, individ-
uals’ number of siblings, dummy if the individ-
ual is the 1st child born within the household,
dummy if the individual is the last child born
in the household, dummy for literate mother,
dummy for literate father, dummy for mother
living in the house, dummy for father living in
the house. Robust standard errors in parenthesis
to correct for heteroscedascity.
Results are in line with the previous findings at household level. No differences are found until
the age of nineteen, while the opposite is true for girls aged between twenty and twenty-five.
These girls were less likely to complete 9th compared to male brothers living in the same house.
On average, being female in Group 4 decreases the probability of completing 9th class by 21,76%
compared to male siblings. Results from OLS and FE estimation suggest that in the Autonomous
Sector of Bissau on average, gender discrimination against girls in age to complete compulsory
education does not exist and differences on gender arise at the end of primary education.
5.3 Ethnicity and religion
To account for social norms and cultural values on educational outcomes, heterogeneity on
ethnicity and religion specific of the ASB is investigated. OLS results are depicted in Table 10 in
Appendix . Not systematic differences are found among ethnicity and religion. For this reason,
only OLS results for Years of Education are reported to show how the model were estimated.
The most interesting results is for Balanta ethnicity. A positive correlation are found between
female Balanta until fifteen years old and years of education compared to males in the same ethnic
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group. However, when comparing female Balanta with other ethnicity, a negative correlation on
the variable of interest is found. On average, years of education are negatively correlated with
being a female Balanta compared to other ethnicities by 0.725 for Group 2 and 0.814 years of
education for Group 3. Available information says that Balanta individual’s life is marked by
initiated rites of passage from early childhood up to fifteen years old and later around heighten
to twenty years old. These factors may explain the negative correlation which emerges in Group
2 and Group 4. Additionally, Balanta are organized in egalitarian societies, hence females might
be involved in the ceremonies common to all members of Balanta communities. On religion,
not significant results are found. Fixed Effect Model (2) conditioned on ethnicity and religion
has been estimated to correct for household unobserved characteristics. When controlling for
household characteristics, the OLS results are no longer significant.
Table 3: FE estimation : Years of education
6 to 11 years old Felupe Balanta Papeis Cristians Muslims Without
Female 0.0565 -0.2536 0.0819 0.0507 0.2412 -0.2257
(0.22) (0.24) (0.20) (0.13) (0.19) (0.27)
Observations 307 342 330 810 536 159
R2adjusted 0.716 0.573 0.705 0.701 0.497 0.708
12 to 15 years old Felupe Balanta Papeis Cristians Muslims Without
Female 1.0006** -0.4496 -0.6598 -0.2171 0.2531 -1.8344**
(0.43) (0.39) (0.70) (0.35) (0.40) (0.72)
Observations 159 158 209 418 302 96
R2 adjusted 0.764 0.485 0.372 0.389 0.358 0.698
16 to 19 years old Felupe Balanta Papeis Cristians Muslims Without
Female -0.4912 0.1350 0.4769 0.0366 -0.2856 -0.6521
(0.75) (0.72) (0.75) (0.46) (0.62) (1.03)
Observations 180 169 161 410 276 81
R2adjusted 0.464 0.629 0.431 0.260 0.177 0.589
20 to 25 years old Felupe Balanta Papeis Cristians Muslims Without
Female -0.9178* -0.8106 0.5818 -0.3679 -0.2250 -0.4035
(0.50) (0.51) (0.65) (0.44) (0.67) (0.75)
Observations 221 200 223 499 276 115
R2 adjusted 0.221 0.233 0.406 0.180 0.047 0.292
Age dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. For controls, please refer to Sectionsection 4
Robust standard errors in parenthesis to correct for heteroscedascity.
Felupe society is characterized by small households founding their subsistence economy on
farming and self-sufficient production. Communities are heterogeneous on social, economic
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and religion structure. Some groups organize themselves by defining egalitarian responsibilities
according to age and gender; others have a strong hierarchical social structure which conditioned
the division of labor between female andmale. In the past, males migrated to the ASB to complete
their studies while females worked as housekeepers. Students living in SAB come back to their
own villages when labor force is needed for cashew nuts harvest (Bayan 2015). According to
results in Table 3 on average, a Felupe girl between twelve and fifteen years old has one year more
of education compared to a Felupe boy in the same cohort. For Group 4 the opposite is true,
where females aged between twenty and twenty-five years old have 0.917 years of education less
than males in the same cohort. No general conclusion can be drawn on existantance of gender
bias among Felupe ethnicity, however results are in line with previous findings16.
5.4 Income
This section reports OLS results on potential gender differences driven by income, depicted in
Table 4. The variable No Annual Shock identifies households which are food secure, i.e. did
not report to have experienced an income shock in the previous twelve months. No Annual
Shock has been chosen because households decisions on education are assumed to be taken
yearly. Differences on education among female and male living in the same households are not
found for Group 1, Group 2 and Group 3 suggesting that income is not a determinant for gender
difference on compulsory education. For Group 4, being a female from a wealthier household is
positively correlated with studying, all else constant. However, the positive correlation between
No Annual Shock and Working may suggest that households less likely to work are also more
likely to be exposed to a shock. This potential source of exogeneity is corrected when controlling
for households unobserved characteristics through the Fixed Effect model (5). Table 12 in the
Appendix show that for Group 1, Group 2, Group 3 there is not gender gap on the educational
variables of interest. For Group 4 gender bias exist and is driven by income. On average, females
from food secure households are more likely to be enrolled at school than boys. The coefficient
for Female in food secure household is statistically different from female experiencing a shock.
16Please refer to Table 11 in the Appendix for T test on education variables for Felupe Ethnic group.
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Table 4: OLS Reduced Form : Gender difference by income
6 to 11 years old Years Enrollment 4th Behind
Female 0.0335 -0.0108 0.0290 0.0564
(0.11) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09)
No Annual Shock -0.1047 0.0095 -0.0165 0.0718
(0.09) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07)
No Annual Shock*Female 0.1079 0.0062 0.0319 -0.1232
(0.13) (0.03) (0.04) (0.11)
Observations 1521 1520 1521 1201
R2 adjusted 0.475 0.109 0.298 0.144
12 to 15 years old Years Enrollment 6th Behind Housework
Female 0.1968 -0.0056 0.0839 -0.0024 0.3503***
(0.22) (0.03) (0.06) (0.19) (0.06)
No Annual Shock 0.1060 -0.0163 0.0350 -0.0129 0.0279
(0.18) (0.02) (0.05) (0.16) (0.06)
No Annual Shock*Female 0.0091 0.0211 -0.0063 -0.2494 0.0477
(0.26) (0.03) (0.07) (0.23) (0.07)
Observations 831 831 831 770 657
R2 adjusted 0.304 0.059 0.206 0.273 0.193
16 to 19 years old Years Enrollment 9th High school Working
Female 0.3624 -0.0095 0.0117 0.0658 -0.1054***
(0.30) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
No Annual Shock -0.1254 0.0018 -0.0612 0.0018 -0.0590*
(0.27) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
No Annual Shock*Female -0.1152 0.0455 0.0280 -0.0756 0.0722*
(0.36) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
Observations 769 768 769 769 738
R2adjusted 0.175 0.029 0.113 0.115 0.025
20 to 25 years old Years Enrollment 9th University Working
Female -0.5474* -0.0784 -0.0972** -0.0278 -0.0293
(0.31) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
No Annual Shock 0.0396 -0.1110** -0.0258 -0.0094 0.0863**
(0.28) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
No Annual Shock*Female 0.5104 0.1653** 0.0756 0.0577 -0.0728
(0.38) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 901 898 901 901 868
R2adjusted 0.149 0.070 0.097 0.050 0.057
Age dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Controls for OLS model: dummy if the individual
is the son/daughter of head of household, individuals’ number of siblings, dummy if the
individual is the 1st child born within the household, dummy if the individual is the last
child born in the household, dummy for literate mother, dummy for literate father, dummy for
mother living in the house, dummy for father living in the house. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis to correct for heteroscedascity.
Table 5: FE estimation: Gender difference by income ( 20 to 25 years old)
No Shock Shock No Shock Shock No Shock Shock No Shock Shock No Shock Shock
Years Years Enrollment Enrollment 9th 9th Continuing Continuing Vocational Vocational
Female -0.4703 -0.8093 0.1570** -0.0592 -0.0971* -0.1590** -0.0906 -0.1750** -0.0133 -0.0172
(0.36) (0.52) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 601 347 600 345 601 347 601 347 601 347
R2adjusted 0.062 0.171 0.167 0.156 0.072 0.148 0.091 0.138 0.052 0.071
Age dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Controls for FEmodel : dummy if the individual is the son/daughter of head of household, individuals’
number of siblings, dummy if the individual is the 1st child born within the household, dummy if the individual is the last child born in the
household, dummy for literate mother, dummy for literate father, dummy for mother living in the house, dummy for father living in the house.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis to correct for heteroscedascity.
To test differences for coefficient Female of both models, the following approach is used (Clogg,






5.5 The role of Institutions
Previous results drove to the conclusion that gender differences among children and teenagers in
age to complete primary education does not exist by ethnicity, religion and income. However,
the opposite is found for older cohorts aged from twenty to twenty-five years old. The hypothesis
behind the nonexistent gender bias in the youngest cohort is the change in the legislation under
the educational reform of 2011 which extended compulsory primary education from 6th to 9th
grade. To assess this hypothesis, three groups of people are chosen to compare the effect of the
reform on the variable Completed 9th. Results from OLS and FE model are depicted in Table 6
for different age range. Girls in Group 3 under the new legislation are more likely to complete
9th grade compared to males not affected by the reform by by 11.15%. Results confirm the initial
assumption on the role of Institution on closing the gender gap on education and support previous
findings. This outcome suggests that the reform improved female conditions.
Table 6: OLS and FE estimation : Dependent variable Completed 9th
OLS OLS OLS FE FE FE
14 to 21 15 to 20 16 to 19 14 to 21 15 to 20 16 to 19
Female -0.0385 -0.0366 -0.0248 -0.1191** -0.1437** -0.2120**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09)
Female*Reform 0.1041** 0.1047* 0.0972 0.1602** 0.1523* 0.3235**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14)
Reform 0.0341 0.0589 0.0810 -0.0055 0.0254 0.0418
(0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.19)
Age 0.2617*** 0.5674*** 0.3306 0.3234*** 1.0311*** 0.5121
(0.08) (0.18) (0.60) (0.11) (0.27) (1.08)
Age2 -0.0042* -0.0127** -0.0056 -0.0061** -0.0263*** -0.0107
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03)
Observations 1521 1133 780 1604 1200 828
R2 adjusted 0.269 0.184 0.117 0.283 0.219 0.145
Age dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Controls for OLS model : dummy if the individual
is the son/daughter of head of household, individuals’ number of siblings, dummy if the
individual is the 1st child born within the household, dummy if the individual is the last
child born in the household, dummy for literate mother, dummy for literate father, dummy
for mother living in the house, dummy for father living in the house, years of education
of household head and age of household head. Controls for FE model : same of OLS with
exclusion of years of education of household head and age of household head. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis to correct for heteroscedascity.
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6 Limitations and further research
Limitations are described in this section.The variable Years of Education refers to the individual
highest level of education attained, however information on individuals length of studies is not
available. Data indeed suggest that on average students fall behind in school and further research
may aim at explaining what determines this outcome. The variable Housework accounts for
domestic duties for collection of wood and water, cooking and cleaning occupations, however
data on female care of children and elderly within households is not available. These factors
may help understanding female time allocation among activities. On the models, the following
limitations are encountered. The fixed effect model (2) has been estimated to capture differences
within families and to capture differences among siblings living in the same house. Results,
however do not add much information on findings from Fixed Effect model at household level.
Further research could be addressed toward polygamous households and resources allocation
among their members. OLS model 6 on gender difference by income may not be robust enough
to capture differences in educational outcomes among constraint households. As alreadymention,
data on household income variation is not available and potential available instruments are weak
to estimate a 2SLS model. For these reasons, causality between household income variation and
educational outcomes on gender cannot be established. Additionally, the OLS reduced form relies
on the variable No Annual Shock which is a proxy for household income shock. Information on
the timing, the intensity and the cause of the shock is unknown, limiting the interpretation of the
results. Moreover, the variable used is a self-reported which may limit reliability of estimation.
Results suggest that there is not gender gap among students between six and fifteen years old.
Individuals in this group are the ones attending compulsory education, but households can
choose between public and private education. Research could be extended toward this direction
and capture parental preferences on allocation of resources amongmembers within the household.
Do parents have different preferences over public or private schooling ? Is the choice conditioned
by children gender? Lastly, more knowledge on ethnicity would be essential for the understanding
of cultural norms and social values, which may not be captured in this paper.
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7 Conclusion
Results from this study are summarized in this section. Differences on education by gender have
not been found for children between six and nineteen years old. This finding is supported by
results on ethnicity, religion and household income. Hence, social norms, cultural values and
socio-economic conditions are not determinants for gender bias in primary education in ASB.
Opposite results are found among the cohort of students from twenty to twenty-five years old. In
this group, results exhibits that girls are less likely to work compared to boys, however inference
on the reasons cannot be established. Female might be indeed disadvantaged because of fewer
opportunities in the Labour Market (Jensen 2012), but also the social context may influence
their choices(Malhotra and Mather 1997). Findings suggest that gender differences on education
emerges when education is no longer mandatory and decisions on continuing studying are not
anymore binding from the law. The hypothesis on the role of Institutions on correcting gender
bias is confirmed. Results show indeed that the reform had a positive impact on female education,
increasing girls probability to complete 9th grade. From these finding, girls seem to perform
better when they under the protection of the law and there is optimism for the enforcement of
the legislation. These results suggest that polices on schooling should be fostered encouraging
young generations to continue studying after primary education. In particular, Institutions may
promote access to secondary education and training programs with repercussion on future labor
market opportunities. Finally, education should be considered as a mean to create opportunities
and foster human capital development for long-term growth.
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Table 7: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Household Head
Male 0.713 0.452 2,152
Age 44.951 12.012 2125
Years of education 8.584 4.980 2,148
Ethnicity
Felupe 0.211 0.408 15493
Balanta 0.204 0.403 15493
Papeis 0.195 0.396 15493
Fula 0.135 0.342 15493
Other 0.136 0.343 15493
Mandinga 0.118 0.323 15493
Religion
Cristian 0.511 0.5 15493
Muslim 0.328 0.47 15493
Without 0.095 0.294 15493
Animist 0.047 0.212 15493
More than one 0.019 0.136 15493
6 to 11 (Group 1)
Years of education 2.063 1.57 2291
Enrollment 0.869 0.34 2289
Completed 4th 0.174 0.379 2291
12 to 15 )Group 2)
Years of education 5.327 2.135 1414
Enrollment 0.926 0.261 1413
Completed 4th 0.790 0.406 1414
Completed 6th 0.481 0.5 1414
16 to 19 (Group 3)
Years of education 7.926 2.670 1504
Enrollment 0.818 0.386 1503
Completed 6th 0.837 0.369 1504
Completed 9th 0.429 0.495 1504
Continuing studying 0.270 0.444 1504
20 to 25 (Group 4)
Years of education 9.730 3.348 2304
Enrollment 0.526 0.5 2299
Completed 9th 0.678 0.460 2304
Continuing studying 0.589 0.492 2304
Years behind 2.421 2.251 4032
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Table 8: FE regression at familiar level
6 to 11 years old Years Enrollment Complete 4th Years behind
Female 0.1522 0.0692** 0.0220 -0.0242
(0.13) (0.03) (0.04) (0.12)
Observations 1024 1024 1024 790
R2adjusted 0.656 0.209 0.413 0.236
12 to 15 years old Years Enrollment Complete 6th Years behind
Female -0.3449 0.0091 0.0213 0.3206
(0.32) (0.05) (0.09) (0.28)
Observations 501 501 501 465
R2adjusted 0.296 0.022 0.241 0.210
16 to 19 years old Years Enrollment Complete 9th Years behind
Female -0.5334 0.0174 -0.1429 -0.0522
(0.60) (0.10) (0.11) (0.94)
Observations 408 407 408 214
R2adjusted 0.199 0.077 0.216 0.456
20 to 25 years old Years Enrollment Complete 9th Completed 6th
Female -0.7857 0.0797 -0.2176*** 0.0094
(0.53) (0.11) (0.08) (0.04)
Observations 392 390 392 392
R2 adjusted 0.089 0.166 0.122 0.049
Age dummies YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES
Note: Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Controls : dummy for child
of household head and oldest child. Robust standard errors in parenthesis to
correct for heteroscedascity
Table 9: FE estimation: Labor Market and Marriage
16 to 19 years old No Shock Shock No Shock Shock
Working Working Marriage Marriage
Female -0.0062 0.0614 -0.0094 0.0093
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
Observations 517 262 541 275
R2 adjusted 0.061 0.240 0.049 -0.013
20 to 25 years old No shock Shock No shock Shock
Working Working Marriage Marriage
Female -0.0656 -0.0121 0.0316 -0.0064
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 576 335 601 347
R2 adjusted 0.097 0.045 0.071 0.039
Age dummies YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Controls for FE model :
dummy if the individual is the son/daughter of head of household,
individuals’ number of siblings, dummy if the individual is the 1st
child born within the household, dummy if the individual is the last
child born in the household, dummy for literate mother, dummy for
literate father, dummy for mother living in the house, dummy for
father living in the house. Robust standard errors in parenthesis to
correct for heteroscedascity.
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Table 10: OLS estimation.Years of education
6 to 11 years old Felupe Balanta Papeis Cristians Muslims Without
Female 0.0781 0.1424** 0.0853 0.0414 0.1565** 0.1155*
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06)
Female*Ethnicity 0.2069 -0.1153 0.1584 0.1507 -0.1189 0.0214
(0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.19)
Observations 1543 1543 1543 1543 1543 1543
R2 adjusted 0.479 0.478 0.479 0.479 0.478 0.478
12 to 15 years old Felupe Balanta Papeis Cristians Muslims Without
Female 0.1406 0.3384** 0.1929 0.3095* 0.0969 0.2048
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.14) (0.13)
Female*Ethnicity 0.3732 -0.7251** 0.0585 -0.2140 0.3248 0.0183
(0.29) (0.33) (0.28) (0.24) (0.26) (0.37)
Observations 842 842 842 842 842 842
R2 adjusted 0.306 0.309 0.304 0.305 0.306 0.304
16 to 19 years old Felupe Balanta Papeis Cristians Muslims Without
Female 0.2494 0.2023 0.2074 0.0656 0.4532** 0.2639
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.26) (0.20) (0.19)
Female*Ethnicity 0.1189 0.3407 0.3348 0.4177 -0.5454 0.0970
(0.41) (0.43) (0.39) (0.35) (0.38) (0.54)
Observations 780 780 780 780 780 780
R2 adjusted 0.176 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.178 0.176
20 to 25 years old Felupe Balanta Papeis Cristians Muslims Without
Female -0.2964 -0.0870 -0.3435 -0.4340 -0.2596 -0.2058
(0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.30) (0.20) (0.20)
Female*Ethnicity 0.1333 -0.8136* 0.3295 0.3183 -0.0207 -0.4749
(0.39) (0.43) (0.41) (0.37) (0.47) (0.55)
Observations 907 907 907 907 907 907
R2 adjusted 0.144 0.147 0.144 0.145 0.144 0.144
Age dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.Robust Standard error in parenthesis to correct for heteroscedascity.
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Controls for OLS model : dummy if the
individual is the son/daughter of head of household, individuals’ number of siblings,
dummy if the individual is the 1st child born within the household, dummy if the
individual is the last child born in the household, dummy for literate mother, dummy
for literate father, dummy for mother living in the house, dummy for father living in the
house, years of education of household head and age of household head.
Table 11: Years of Education for Felupe Ethnicity
Sample Male Female
Age N. Mean N. Mean N. Mean Diff/(s.e)
6 to 11 437 2.27 206 2.12 231 2.41 0.23***
(0.12)
12 to 15 269 5.89 134 5.52 135 6.25 0.68***
(0.22)
16 to 19 345 8.81 156 8.94 189 8.71 -0.24***
(0.25)
20 to 25 506 10.8 233 11.1 273 10.5 -0.54*
(0.23)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Controlling for age
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Table 12: FE estimation: gender difference by income
6 to 11 years old No shock Shock No Shock Shock No Shock Shock No Shock Shock
Years Years Enrollment Enrollment Complete 4th Complete 4th Years Behind Years Behind
Female 0.1181 -0.0247 0.0412 0.0012 0.0532 0.0297 0.0038 -0.1327
(0.12) (0.21) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.09) (0.13)
Observations 1105 489 1104 489 1105 489 1105 489
R2adjusted 0.649 0.524 0.171 0.183 0.418 0.297 0.153 0.216
12 to 15 years old No Shock Shock No Shock Shock No Shock Shock No Shock Shock No Schock Shock
Years Years Enrollment Enrollment Complete 6th Complete 6th 1cYears Behind Years Behind Housework Housework
Female 0.2672 -0.6054 0.0377 -0.0778 0.1496* -0.0672 -0.0467 0.2115 0.6201*** 0.2195
(0.28) (0.53) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.29) (0.48) (0.10) (0.26)
Observations 596 275 596 275 596 275 551 258 464 222
R2 adjusted 0.287 0.265 0.006 0.102 0.198 0.335 0.212 0.404 0.622 0.315
16 to 19 years old No Shock Shock No Shock Shock No Shock Shock No Shock Shock No Shock Shock
Years Years Enrollment Enrollment Complete 6th Complete 6th Complete 9th Complete 9th Continuing Continuing
Female -0.3000 -0.1187 0.0238 -0.0808 -0.0069 0.0093 -0.0218 -0.1602 -0.1130 0.0713
(0.45) (0.51) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
Observations 541 275 541 274 541 275 541 275 541 275
R2 adjusted 0.250 0.317 0.081 0.125 0.185 0.152 0.148 0.207 0.208 0.239
Age dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Group 1: 6-11 years old
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Controls for FE model : dummy if the individual is the son/daughter of head of household, individuals’ number of
siblings, dummy if the individual is the 1st child born within the household, dummy if the individual is the last child born in the household, dummy for literate
mother, dummy for literate father, dummy for mother living in the house, dummy for father living in the house. Robust standard errors in parenthesis to correct
for heteroscedascity.
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